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Abstract
Mandatory data disclosure is an essential feature for credible empirical work but
comes at a cost: First, authors might invest less in data generation if they are not
the full residual claimants of their data after their rst publication. Second, authors
might "strategically delay" the time of submission of papers in order to fully exploit
their data in subsequent research. We analyze a three-stage model of publication and
data disclosure. We derive exact conditions for positive welfare e¤ects of mandatory
data disclosure. However, we nd that the transition to mandatory data disclosure has
negative welfare properties if authors delay strategically.
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JEL classi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1 Introduction
It is the policy of the American Economic Review to publish papers only if
the data used in the analysis are clearly and precisely documented and are readily
available to any researcher for purposes of replication. Authors of accepted papers
that contain empirical work, simulations, or experimental work must provide to
the Review, prior to publication, the data, programs, and other details of the
computations su¢ cient to permit replication. These will be posted on the AER
Web site.1
Data sharing is an essential feature for the scientic principle of credibility, replication
and further research. It guarantees that research methods used to produce the results are
known and that incorrect results can be withdrawn from the cumulative body of knowledge
(Anderson et al., 2008; Dewald et al., 1986; Vlaeminck and Wagner, 2014). Also, replicable
research fosters learning and thus facilitates the development of subsequent research, which
boosts scientic advancement. However, whereas a large majority of researchers seems to
recognize the importance of data sharing, they are reluctant to apply this principle in practice
(Nelson, 2009). Recently, some of the major economics journals have introduced mandatory
data disclosure policies which require authors to share their data prior to publication. While
these policies provide a strong institutional response in order to overcome low data sharing
rates they may have detrimental e¤ects for researchers. Authors who invest in costly data
generation, e.g., collecting data and programming, are not the full residual claimants of
the data after the rst publication and might decrease their initial e¤ort to generate it. In
addition, they may strategically delay the submission of papers in order to fully exploit their
data. In contrast, disclosed data might increase the value of a publication for its author by
increasing its credibility. It may also generate positive e¤ects for the scientic community
as the data could be used for subsequent research and validation.
In this paper we rst derive the optimal e¤ort choices to generate data under di¤erent
data policies. We then compare the optimal e¤ort choices and publication strategies (no
delay versus strategic delay) across di¤erent policies in order to derive welfare implications.
We set up a three-stage model of publication and data disclosure to analyze the interaction
between a data-creating researcher and a competing researcher and study the incentive and
welfare e¤ects of data disclosure. The former researcher exerts e¤ort to create the data in the
initial stage. She may then either publish her paper(s) sequentially in the next two stages
1http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data.php (last accessed 6 June 2014). Among others, the Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy, and Econometrica adopt
virtually the same policy.
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or altogether in the last stage to avoid self-induced competition associated with disclosed
data. Our motivating example is a researcher who exerts e¤ort to create a unique (possibly
hand-collected) data set in order to pursue a novel research agenda, i.e., a set of papers using
the same data. This researcher chooses the e¤ort to create data in the initial stage of the
model, the number of papers written based on the data and whether and when to share the
data with the research community. These decisions depend on the data availability policy
of journals. Under No Policy, i.e., the status quo of most journals in economics, the creator
of data can freely choose whether and when to share the data and whether to write one or
two papers using the data. Following Dasgupta and David (1994), who emphasize that an
institutional response is necessary to overcome the gap between researchersdemand for data
sharing and its voluntary provision, we consider a second policy type, the First Paper Policy.
The leading example is the data availability policy of the American Economic Association,
which forces the creator of data to share the data after the rst publication so that the data
is available to the other researcher.
The creator of the data has a strong incentive to protect the competitive advantage
associated with the data, as she might benet from using the data for subsequent research
and keep the data secret until their private value is fully exploited (Anderson et al., 2008;
Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014; Stephan, 1996). If the data is kept private, another
researcher cannot use it for replication or for subsequent research. The model endogenizes
the decision to strategically delay the time of publication and thus the disclosure of data
under the First Paper Policy. We derive exact conditions for positive welfare e¤ects of
mandatory data disclosure. However, we also nd that the transition to mandatory data
disclosure has negative welfare properties if it induces the data-creating researcher to delay
her submissions strategically. In general, the welfare e¤ects depend on the cost to generate
data, the impatience of a researcher to publish (discount factor) and the additional value
created by sharing data both for the data-creating researcher and the competing researcher.
Several top-tier economics journals have recently adopted mandatory data disclosure poli-
cies. However, the vast majority of economics journals either do not have a data availability
policy or are reluctant to enforce it (McCullough, 2009; McCullough and Vinod, 2003). In
addition, Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer (forthcoming) provide evidence for the sta-
tus quo in economics with respect to voluntary data sharing using 488 observations randomly
taken from researchersacademic webpages and public data repositories. Out of the sample,
435 researchers (89.14%) neither have a data and code section nor indicate whether and
where their data is available. 8.81% of researchers share some of their data whereas only
2.05% fully share. Also, Anderson et al. (2008) suggest that authors generally hesitate to
share their data and code despite their pre-publication commitment to provide this infor-
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mation. This may suggest that editors, referees and readers are condent that the empirical
results presented in the papers are always credible and robust. Unfortunately this is not the
case (Lacetera and Zirulia, 2011). Empirical economics articles can often not be replicated
(Dewald et al., 1986; McCullough et al., 2006 and 2008). This raises great concerns regarding
the credibility and reliability of empirical work.
In a recent and heavily debated2 article Angrist and Pischke (2010, p. 3) argue that better
research design and the consequent causal interpretation of the regression coe¢ cients "is
taking the con out of econometrics". Even though the identication strategy is essential for
good empirical work, without the possibility of replication and extension, which is provided
by sharing the data and codes, doubts3 about the credibility of empirical work remain.
In addition, researchers who do subsequent research have to develop the data themselves
if the data are not shared, resulting in a (socially wasteful) duplication of research e¤orts.
Open access to research data may on the one hand increase the credibility of authors as their
work might be replicated by others and on the other hand facilitates new research as both
data and codes would be readily available (McCullough and Vinod, 2003).4 Even though
most scholars agree that there are benets of data sharing this view is not unanimous.
A common objection to making data and code available is o¤ered by Mo¢ tt (2007) and
McCullough (2009, p. 124):
"Economists call the patentproblem the problem that those who put the
e¤ort into constructing a data set and writing programs (months of work) have
the right to use it for further research for X years."
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a simple
two-player three-stage model of data disclosure. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of di¤erent
data disclosure policies on optimal e¤ort and data sharing behaviour. In Section 4 we
study the ambiguous welfare e¤ects of mandatory data disclosure. Section 5 provides policy
recommendations and Section 6 concludes our study.
2The replies to this article can be found here: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/angrist/publications
(last accessed June 6 2014).
3As McCullough states it in Glenn (2008): "If they [the authors] are not making their data and code
available, then I have to think that they have something to hide. [...] There is a lot of nonreplicable research
published in economics. We need to change the profession so that readers can expect that there actually
does exist data and code that will reproduce the published results. Right now, at many journals, we cannot
expect that."
4For example, in computational science, the data and the code are considered by peers as the real
scientic contribution (Buckheit and Donoho, 1995). Claerbouts Principle states that: "An article about
computational science in a scientic publication is not the scholarship itself, it is merely advertising of the
scholarship. The actual scholarship is the complete software development environment and the complete set
of instructions which generated the gures" (Buckheit and Donoho, 1995, p. 59).
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2 A Simple Model of Data Disclosure
This model analyzes the optimal e¤ort choices of a researcher, R, to generate novel data
and to share the data produced with the scientic community, which is represented by a
second researcher, C, who may use the data for subsequent research. We consider a three-
stage model, t = 0; 1; 2, where the incentives to share depend on two factors. First, data
disclosure may increase the value of a published article for R, e.g., it may increase the
credibility of the article. Second, disclosure may change Rs personal value of the data after
the last publication. For instance, the loss of control of disclosed data may lead to awed
interpretation of the data, which may negatively a¤ect Rs reputation and thus her personal
value of the data after the last publication. We study two data availability policies of journals.
Under No Policy (henceforth NP ), R can freely choose whether and when to share the data
and whether to write one or two papers using the data. In contrast, the First Paper Policy
(FPP ) forces R to share the data after the rst publication so that the data is available to
C. For simplicity, we consider a maximum number of two journal publications that a single
researcher can achieve by using the same data set. We assume that the marginal benet
from the re-use of the data is decreasing and that the returns to publication are diminishing
with increased output (Tuckman and Leahey, 1973). Under both policies, R chooses e¤ort
e0 to create a data set in the initial stage. The quality and the value of the data set and
the publication increase in this initial e¤ort. Thereby, it also a¤ects Rs decision to disclose
the data and the quality of published articles which are derived from the data. Rs e¤ort to
publish is given by e1 in the rst stage and by e2 in the second stage. As Figure 1 illustrates,
there are six possibilities, four under NP and two under FPP . Under NP , R may choose
to (1) publish one paper and share in t = 1 (1-Share), (2) publish two subsequent papers in
t = 1 and t = 2 and share in t = 2 (2-Share), (3) write one paper in t = 1 and never share
(1-Never) and (4) publish two subsequent papers and never share (2-Never). Under FPP ,
R may (5) choose to publish the rst paper in t = 1 while being forced to share the data. In
stage 2, C will then choose e¤ort x2 and publish a paper using Rs data (No Strategic Delay).
(6) R may strategically delay the rst publication in order to evade the forced disclosure of
data and publish two papers in t = 2 (Strategic Delay). By "strategic delay" we mean that
a researcher does not submit her papers one after another but all at the same time after the
completion of the second paper in order to maintain the exclusive use of the data.
5
No Policy First Paper Policy
Researcher (R) chooses effort e0 to create data R chooses effort e0 to create data
(1)
R publishes
one paper
and shares
data
(2)
R publishes
her first
paper
(5)
R publishes one paper
Stage 0
Stage 1
Stage 2
(3)
R publishes
one paper
and never
shares
(4)
R publishes
her first
paper
Competing
researcher
(C) publishes
one paper
using R’s data
R publishes
her second
paper and
shares data
R publishes
her second
paper and
never
shares data
(6)
R writes her first paper but
strategically delays
submission in order to
evade disclosure of data
C publishes one paper
using R‘s data
R publishes her first and
second paper at once
Status quo in Economics
Strategic Delay
1-share 2-share 1-never 2-never No Strategic Delay Strategic DelayScenario
Figure 1: Stages of the model
Figure 1 illustrates a set of six reasonable publication strategies for R under the two
data policies under study. For instance, Rs decision to write one or two papers depends on
the value of the data for subsequent use. In addition, Rs decision to disclose or withhold
data depends on her personal value of the data after the last publication. For instance,
data disclosure may increase Rs personal value of the data, e.g., due to subsequent use
in data-journals. However, it may also be the case that the data has a higher value for
R if it remains her private information. For instance, loss of control associated with data
sharing can result in data falsication or awed interpretation that may negatively a¤ect Rs
reputation (Costello, 2009; Perrino et al., 2013). Thus, even though we assume that data
disclosure always has a positive e¤ect on the value of the published article that is based on
this data, withholding the data after the nal publication may be the optimal strategy for
R in our model.
Let v be the value of a research idea that is generated by the scientic community based
on Rs data. Let  > 1 be a creativity coe¢ cient that measures the superior creativity
of the scientic community as compared to the single researcher R. This is an important
assumption as it implicitly states that the social optimum could be reached if the research
was done by C. The intuition for this assumption is that C would achieve the highest value
of research when he initially creates the data and writes both articles. In our model, however,
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R initially produces the data and writes (at least) the rst paper. For instance, we assume
that R has the initial research idea together with exclusive access to data sources that give
him a head start in the creation of data. Following Fudenberg et al. (1983)5, we argue that
this head start enables R to preempt C from generating data (as well as publication as long
as the data are private information). A time coe¢ cient, c > 1, indicates that the value of
the second idea based on the data is lower than that of the rst idea. Let v

and v
c be
the value of the idea for R based on the data in stage 1 and 2, respectively. Henceforth, we
normalize v to one. The higher c is, the stronger does the value of the idea based on the data
devaluate. Let 1
c
be the value of the idea based on the data for C in the second stage. As
 > 1, 1
c
> 1
c . Thus, data availability creates positive spillovers as it enables C to publish
an article of higher value as compared to Rs second article under non-disclosure.
The cost functions are given by c (et) = 12e
2
t for R and c (x2) =
1
2
x22 for C, i.e., we assume
increasing marginal costs of both data and article creation. Without data no research occurs
and players get Ui;kmj = 0 with players i = R;C , policies k = NP;FPP , number of papers
published j = 1; 2 and (in case that k = NP ) Rs sharing decision m = share; never.
Welfare is given by Wkmj = UR;kmj + UC;kmj .
We will derive the optimal e¤ort levels both for the data and paper creation. Then we
will compare the total utility generated by R and C under di¤erent data disclosure policies
in order to evaluate the policy implications of each regulation. We start by describing the
setup of the model and the interaction between R and C under NP and under FPP . Then
we will evaluate changes in the welfare function caused by a policy change from NP to FPP .
2.1 No Policy
In stage 0, R chooses e¤ort e0 to create the data. In stage 1, R chooses e¤ort e1 to publish
the rst paper that elaborates on the data and decides whether to share the data with the
scientic community. In stage 2, there are two possibilities. First, if R does not share data
in stage 1, she chooses e¤ort e2 to publish a second paper with the same data and whether
to share the data with the scientic community. Second, if R shares the data in stage 1, C
chooses e¤ort x2 to publish a paper by using Rs data. R benets from keeping the data
private information. This exclusive use may increase Rs ex ante incentives to exert e¤ort
on the data creation and preparation, which is an essential part of empirical economics. The
higher Rs initial e¤ort to create the data, the higher are her benets from the journal article
that is based on the data. However, the scientic community, C, would benet if R shares
5Fudenberg et al. (1983) analyze a patent race in which two rms compete for a preliminary discovery
in the rst stage and for a patent in the second stage. They show that the rst entrant can preempt the
followers entering the race if the former has a su¢ ciently large head start.
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the data. The benets consist of the replicability of the results, further research without the
costs of data duplication and better research ideas and methods as the data and codes are
shared among a large community. The fundamental di¤erence between the two researchers
is that R has a data set which would be valuable for C, but C cannot inuence Rs decision
when to share the data as there is no market for the exchange of data. The assumption
that there is no market for data is very plausible in economics. The only market for data in
economics is between institutions and researchers but not between researchers. Thus there is
no monetary incentive to share the data and an e¢ cient allocation of e¤orts not achievable
(Coase, 1960).
Researcher publishes one paper and shares at t = 1 (1-Share): Appendix A (B)
provides all calculations for the NP (FPP ) scenario. Rs optimization problem under 1-
Share is


e0e1
1

(1 + )  1
2
e21

+ 2De0  
1
2
e20  ! max; (1)
where t is the discount factor at time t which measures Rs impatience to publish. For
instance, this impatience arises from the researchers ambition to push her academic career by
obtaining tenure through publication (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2010).
To illustrate, for  = 1, R is indi¤erent between a publication today and a publication
tomorrow.  represents the change of the value of an article due to the disclosure of the
data. We assume that  is positive and not too large, 0 <   1
2
. For instance, suppose
that the availability of the data used in an article is perceived by peers as a signal of quality
(Dasgupta and David, 1994). In that sense, data sharing may be seen as a means to disclose
Rs private information on the quality of her empirical article. Thus, researchers of higher
quality may be more likely to share their data voluntarily in order to signal the robustness
of their results (Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer, forthcoming; Feigenbaum and Levy,
1993). In addition, empirical articles for which the applied data is publicly available may
generate more citations. Let D (ND) measure the value of the data for R after the last
publication if R discloses (does not disclose) the data and dene  = D
ND
. For instance,
the data set might contain information that is valuable for non- or semi-academic projects,
such as expert or policy advice, that do not necessarily lead to further scientic publications.
Second, the data set itself might be cited in subsequent literature as it provides, for instance,
a widely applicable index. In addition, a data set could become valuable if data journals
are later established in economics. In these cases, the remaining personal value of the data
after the last publication depends on whether the data are public or private information.
The lower  the lower are ceteris paribus Rs incentives to share data. The higher the scope
for individual use of the data, the higher will be Rs incentives to keep the data. The rst
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term in (1) is Rs discounted net value from publishing in t = 1. It is given by the di¤erence
between the individual gross value from publishing and the e¤ort cost to write the paper.
The individual gross value from publishing depends positively on the e¤ort to create the data,
the e¤ort to write the paper and . The second term is Rs discounted value of the disclosed
data set, which depends positively on the e¤ort to create it. The third term describes the
e¤ort cost to create the data.
Cs optimization problem under 1-Share depends on Rs optimal e¤ort to create data,
e
0;NP share1
, and is given by:
2

e0;NP share1 x2
1
c
  1
2
x22

 ! max : (2)
Hence, C maximizes his discounted net value from publishing in t = 2, i.e. the gross
value from publishing in t = 2 minus the e¤ort cost to write the paper. We obtain the
following optimal e¤orts: e
0;NP share1
= 
2D
1 ( 1)
2
(1+)2
, e
1;NP share1
= e
0;NP share1
 1

(1 + ) and
x
2;NP share1
= e
0;NP share1
 1
c
. Henceforth, we only consider positive optimal e¤orts and assume
1 > 
 
1

2
(1 + )2.6 Optimal e¤orts in all stages are increasing in D and . The higher the
value of the article and the data due to data disclosure, the higher is Rs initial e¤ort to create
the data, e
0;NP share1
. Optimal e¤orts chosen by C and R in stages 1 and 2 then depend on Rs
initial e¤ort of data creation. The higher the quality of the data, the higher is the benet from
an article and thus the higher are the e¤orts to publish it. We obtain the following utilities for
R and C, respectively: U
R;NP share1
= 1
2
e
0;NP share1
 2D and UC;NP share1 =
1
2
(e
0;NP share1
)22
 
1
c
2
.
Rs utility depends positively on the remaining personal value of the data after the last
publication. It also increases if the positive -e¤ect on the value of the article due to
the disclosure of the data is more pronounced. Cs utility increases if, at optimum, R
increases his e¤ort to create the data. It decreases if the devaluation of the value of the
research idea based on Rs data over time is more pronounced. Overall welfare is given by
W 
NP share1
= U
R;NP share1
+U
C;NP share1
= 1
2
2(e
0;NP share1
D+(e0;NP share1 )
2
 
1
c
2
). It is rising in D
and  and decreasing in c. Overall welfare is also decreasing in the inferiority of Rs research
idea as compared to Cs research idea, which is measured by the creativity coe¢ cient .
Note that, as the data is shared after the rst stage, C publishes the second article. Sharing
data after the rst stage creates positive spillovers as data now can be used to extract the
highest value of subsequent research.
6See also Proposition 0 below.
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Researcher publishes two subsequent papers and shares at t = 2 (2-Share):
Rs optimization problem under 2-Share is


e0e1
1

(1 +   )  1
2
e21

+ 2

e0e2
1
c   (1 + ) 
1
2
e22

+ 3De0  
1
2
e20  ! max : (3)
The rst term in (3) is the discounted net value of publishing in t = 1. Therein, the
gross value of publishing is given by e0e1 1 (1 +   ) and e¤ort cost are given by 12e21. Note
that in contrast to 1-Share, the positive -e¤ect is discounted under 2-Share as data avail-
ability develops its positive e¤ect on the value of the rst article at a later stage. The
second term in (3) is the discounted net value of publishing in t = 2. Therein, the gross
value of publishing is given by e0e2 1c (1 + ). It accounts for the devaluation of the research
idea over time. The third term is Rs discounted value of the disclosed data set. The last
term describes the e¤ort cost to create the data. Again, we only consider positive optimal
e¤orts, 1 > 
 
1

2
(1 +   )2 + 2   1
c
2
(1 + )2. We obtain the following optimal e¤orts:
e
0;NP share2
= 
3D
1 ( 1)
2
(1+)2 2( 1c)
2
(1+)2
, e
1;NP share2
= e
0;NP share2
 1

(1 +   ) and e
2;NP share2
=
e
0;NP share2
 1
c (1 + ). We obtain the following utility of R, which is equal to overall welfare
as C does not generate any utility in this case: U
R;NP share2
= W 
NP share2
= 1
2
e
0;NP share2
 3D.
Overall welfare increases in D and  and decreases in c and .
Researcher publishes one paper in t = 1 and never shares (1-Never): The optimiza-
tion problem of R is given by


e0e1
1

  1
2
e21

+ 2NDe0  
1
2
e20  ! max : (4)
In contrast to 1-Share, there is no positive -e¤ect in the rst term of (4). The second
term is Rs discounted value of the undisclosed data set. We obtain the following optimal
e¤orts: e0;NPnever1 =
2ND
1 ( 1)
2 , e1;NPnever1 = e

0;NPnever1
1

. We obtain the following utility (overall
welfare): UR;NPnever1 = W

NPnever1
= 1
2
e0;NPnever1  
2ND. Note that C does not generate any
utility in this case. Overall welfare increases in ND and decreases in .
Researcher publishes two subsequent papers and never shares (2-Never): Rs
optimization problem under NP if she never shares7 is


e0e1
1

  1
2
e21

+ 2

e0e2
1
c    
1
2
e22

+ 3NDe0  
1
2
e20  ! max : (5)
7Note that if R does not share the data immediately after her last publication, she will never share.
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We obtain the following optimal e¤orts: e0;NPnever2 =
3ND
1 ( 1)
2 2( 1c)
2 , e1;NPnever2 = e

0;NPnever2

1

and e2;NPnever2 = e

0;NPnever2
 1
c . Note that e

0;NPnever2
> 0 when e
0;NP share2
> 0. We obtain
the following utility (overall welfare): UR;NPnever2 = W

NPnever2
= 1
2
e0;NPnever2  
3ND. Note
that C does not generate any utility in this case. From the optimal e¤orts under the four
NP scenarios, we obtain:
Proposition 0: Positive e¤orts condition All optimal e¤orts are well-dened and pos-
itive for all  2 (0; 1] if (1 + )2 < c2
1+c2
2.
All proofs are provided in Appendix C. However, straightforward proofs are omitted. We
now analyze the conditions under which R does not share her data.
Proposition 1: Never Share Under NP the Researcher can decide not to share only if
D < ND, i.e., if  =
D
ND
< 1. (i) She will always choose not to share if  is su¢ ciently
small, i.e.   l, where l = l() depends negatively on . (ii) For l <  < 1 she will
choose not to share if she is impatient enough, i.e.   h, where h = h(; ) depends
nonpositively both on  and .
(i) Intuitively, R does not have an incentive to share data if the remaining personal value
of the undisclosed data after the last publication by far exceeds the personal value of the
disclosed data. In this case, the disclosure-driven decrease in the remaining value of the data
more than outweighs the positive "-e¤ect" associated with the increase in the value of an
article due to data disclosure. Note that (i) illustrates the status quo in economics as only
very few economists voluntarily share their data with the scientic community (Andreoli-
Versbach and Mueller-Langer, forthcoming). (ii) However, this result does not hold true in
general if the above-stated decrease in the remaining value of the data is su¢ ciently low,
i.e.  > l. Then, the level of patience comes into play and only a su¢ ciently impatient
researcher will keep the data private information. In this case, the (strongly) discounted
"-e¤ect" does not outweigh the disclosure-driven decrease in the remaining value of the
data.
Finally, note that, for   1, 1-Never (2-Never) would be strictly dominated by 1-Share
(2-Share).
2.2 First Paper Policy
To simplify matters we omit labels for the obvious number of papers published, j = 1; 2, and
Rs sharing decision, m = share; never, in e¤orts, utilities and welfare under FPP .
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First Paper Policy without Strategic Delay: Under FPP without strategic delay
(NSD), R publishes the rst paper in t = 1. She is required to share the data and does not
compete with C in t = 2 (due to the competitive advantage that is captured in Cs superior
creativity). Rs optimization problem is


e0e1

1


(1 + )  1
2
e21

+ 2De0  
1
2
e20  ! max : (6)
Rs maximization problem underNSD is the same as under 1-Share. The main di¤erence,
however, is that she is forced to make the data available under FPP upon publication of the
rst paper. FPP is detrimental to R as it reduces her set of possible publication strategies.
The competitor C uses the data and publishes a paper in t = 2. Cs optimization problem
is
2

e0;FPPNSD  x2
1
c
  1
2
x22

 ! max : (7)
The outcomes under NSD and 1-Share are identical for T = 0; 1; 2 and i = R;C, that
is, eT;FPPNSD = e

T;NP share1
, x2;FPPNSD = x

2;NP share1
, Ui;FPPNSD = U

i;NP share1
and W FPPNSD =
W 
NP share1
.
First Paper Policy with Strategic Delay: In contrast to the previous section, R may
choose to delay her publications in order to fully exploit her data under FPP . In this case,
she will incur the costs of completing the rst and second paper in the rst and second period,
respectively. However, she will realize the total benets associated with the publication of
two papers in the second period, as she strategically delays publication in order to keep the
data private. Under FPP with strategic delay (henceforth, SD), R does not publish in t = 1
but publishes the rst and the second paper together in t = 2. Rs optimization problem is


e0e1
1

(1 + )  1
2
e21

+ 2

e0e2
1
c   (1 + ) 
1
2
e22

+ 3De0  
1
2
e20  ! max : (8)
To understand Rs optimization problem under SD, it is constructive to compare it with
Rs optimization problem under 2-share as given by (3). The second, third and fourth term
is identical under both scenarios. The rst term, however, is di¤erent if R is not perfectly
patient, i.e.,  < 1. In contrast to 2-Share, R realizes the net value of the publication of
the rst paper at a later stage under SD. Under 2-Share, the rst paper is published right
after completion in the rst stage whereas its publication is postponed to the second stage
under SD. We obtain the following optimal e¤orts: e0;FPPSD =
3D
1 3( 1)
2
(1+)2 2( 1c)
2
(1+)2
,
e1;FPPSD = e0;FPPSD  1 (1 + ) and e2;FPPSD = e0;FPPSD  1c (1 + ). We obtain the following
optimal utility (overall welfare): UR;FPPSD = W

FPPSD
= 1
2
e0;FPPSD
3D. Note that C does
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not generate any utility in this case. Overall welfare increases in D and  and decreases in
c and .
3 Analysis and Comparison of No Policy and First Pa-
per Policy
We analyze the e¤ect of the transition from NP to FPP on Rs e¤orts to create data. We
obtain:
Proposition 2: Change in e¤orts under FPP Transition to FPP (i) reduces e¤orts
to create data, (1) if  is su¢ ciently small, i.e.  < le < 1, where le = le() depends
negatively on , or (2) if le <  < 1 and the Researcher is impatient enough, i.e.  < he,
where he = he(; ) depends negatively on both  and , or (3) if  > h and the Researcher
is very patient, i.e.  > he1 := maxfh1 ; hSDg, where he1 = he1 () depends negatively on
. (ii) does not inuence e¤orts to create data if the Researcher chooses to share after one
publication, which is the case when   1 and the Researcher is not very patient, i.e.   h1,
where h1 = h1() depends negatively on , or when h    1 and h    h1. (iii)
increases e¤orts to create data (1) if le <  < 1 and he <  < min fh; hSDg, or (2) if
ule() <  < h1 and  > max f01 ; hSD ; h1g.
The economic intuition behind these results is the following. (i)(1) Intuitively, if  is
su¢ ciently low, i.e. sharing the data would harm R signicantly, the transition to FPP
reduces her incentives to create data in the rst place independently of Rs publication
choice under NP . (i)(2) If 1-Never is optimal for R under NP , i.e.  is su¢ ciently low, the
transition to FPP reduces Rs incentives to create the data. Then, the obligation to share
reduces her returns from the data. Note, however, that the transition does not induce R to
delay submission strategically in this case. (i)(3) Whenever R chooses to delay submission
strategically under FPP and to share after two publications under NP , the transition to
FPP reduces Rs e¤orts to create data. Intuitively, both scenarios (2-Share under NP and
SD under FPP ) lead to the same outcome in the sense that the data are available after two
publications. However, R generates a lower (discounted) utility from the rst publication
under FPP with SD as compared to 2-Share under NP .
Under the conditions specied in (ii), 1-Share is optimal for R under NP and NSD is
optimal under FPP . The transition to FPP does not inuence Rs e¤ort to create data as
she is indi¤erent between 1-Share under NP and NSD under FPP .
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(iii) Our analysis suggests that the transition to FPP potentially increases Rs e¤orts
to create data under the following conditions: R is su¢ ciently patient to publish and  is
neither too low, i.e. data sharing is not too harmful, nor too high, i.e. R would not share
data voluntarily under NP . However, the result that the transition to FPP may increase
Rs incentives to create data may seem counterintuitive as one may argue that the set of
choices under FPP is a subset of the set of choices under NP . Note, however, that the
transition to FPP does not make R better o¤ in terms of utility. It forces R to adjust
her optimal e¤ort choice, which ceteris paribus turns out to be e¤ort-increasing under the
conditions specied in (iii).
We provide the exact conditions under which R nds it optimal to delay submission
strategically under FPP in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Strategic Delay The Researcher will delay strategically under FPP if
and only if she is su¢ ciently patient, i.e.   hSD , where hSD = hSD() depends negatively
on .
Intuitively, if R is su¢ ciently patient, the additional benets from the second publication
more than outweigh the delayed realization of the benets from the rst paper under SD
as compared to NSD. Regarding the interpretation of this proposition, note that junior
researchers are typically more impatient than senior researchers because they are in need
of a good publication soon in order to obtain a tenured position (Dasgupta and David,
1994; Gans and Stern, 2010). Hence, one may interpret Proposition 3 in the sense that
junior researchers are ceteris paribus less likely to strategically delay their submission than
senior (tenured) researchers. However, it is also reasonable to assume that the value of an
additional publication in terms of career concerns is higher for (untenured) junior researchers
than for (tenured) senior researchers for the same reason (Coupé et al., 2006; Siegfried and
White, 1973; Tuckman and Leahey, 1973).8 This would make SD relatively more attractive
to young scholars. Hence, the question of whether junior researchers have lower incentives
than senior researchers to delay strategically depends on whether the "impatience e¤ect"
dominates the countervailing "marginal publication e¤ect" under the assumption that the
rate of data depreciation does not di¤er between junior and senior researchers.
8For instance, writing about the career incentives of tenured professors, Stanfords tenured Professor
Robert Hall (2009, p. 1) states: "Now that you have tenure, the number of papers you produce is amazingly
irrelevant."
14
4 Welfare Analysis
We analyze the welfare properties of the transition to FPP . The precise conditions under
which this transition has neutral, negative or positive welfare properties are given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4: Welfare e¤ects Transition to FPP (i) does not inuence welfare if
the Researcher chooses to share after one publication, which is the case when   1 and
the Researcher is not very patient, i.e.   h1, where h1 = h1() depends negatively on
, or when h    1 and h    h1. (ii) (1) It increases welfare if lw <   1
and l <  < h0 := minfh; hSDg, where lw = lw() depends negatively on  and both
l = l(; ) and h0 = h0(; ) depend negatively both on  and , or (2) if l3 <  < h1
and 01 <  < minfhSD ; 00g, where l3 () and h1 () depend negatively on . (iii)
It reduces welfare when  is su¢ ciently small, i.e.  < l1, where l1 = l1() depends
negatively on , or if the Researcher is very patient, i.e.  > hSD .
The economic intuition behind these results is the following. (i) 1-Share under NP
and NSD under FPP lead to the same outcome from a social welfare perspective. Both
researchers are indi¤erent between NP and FPP .
(ii) (1) Under these conditions, R switches from 1-Never under NP to NSD under
FPP . The welfare gain due to the additional paper published by C under FPP more than
outweighs the potentially negative impact of forced data sharing on R. (2) R switches from
2-Never to NSD under FPP while  is su¢ ciently high.
(iii) These results specify the conditions under which the transition to FPP has negative
welfare properties. First, the transition to FPP reduces welfare if it induces R to delay
submission strategically. If R delays strategically, two negative e¤ects emerge: There will
be a delay in the time the scientic knowledge is made public and C cannot use the data
to publish his (higher value) paper. Analytically, it can be shown that Rs utility under
the conditions which incentivize her to choose 2-Share under NP always exceeds her utility
under SD under FPP . In addition, for all combinations of  and  for which 2-Share is not
chosen under NP , it is dominated by one of the other strategies under NP . Therefore, SD
is not only dominated by 2-Share but also by all other possible strategies under NP . Thus,
the transition to SD always decreases Rs utility and thus overall welfare independent of
the researchers strategy under NP . Second, for su¢ ciently low , the transition to FPP
reduces welfare if it forces R to switch from never sharing after the rst or second publication
under NP to not delaying strategically. In this case, the negative e¤ect of the transition
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to FPP on the constrained R more than outweighs its positive e¤ect on C. Forced data
sharing associated with the transition to FPP is not a recommendable policy option under
the conditions specied in (iii). It is a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for positive
welfare properties of forced data sharing that the implementation of FPP is complemented
by other policies which deter strategic delay, such as career incentives.
Graphical Approximation of the Main Results Figure 2 illustrates Rs choices and
the e¤ects of the transition from NP to FPP depending on the impatience rate,  (vertical
axis), and the ratio of data values after all publications in case of disclosure/nondisclosure,
 = D
ND
(horizontal axis). Other model parameters are kept constant (c =  = 1:5 and
 = 0:2).
The black lines divide the whole area into 4 zones, indicating Rs choices under NP : R
chooses 1-Never in the bottom left zone, 2-Never in the top left zone (see Proposition 1),
2-Share in the top right zone and 1-Share in the bottom right zone. The horizontal blue
line denotes the border for Rs choice under FPP : she chooses to delay strategically (SD)
above the blue line and not to delay (NSD) below it. It represents hSD from P(roposition)
3.
Figure 2: Researchers choices and the e¤ects of the transition from NP to FPP
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The light blue area indicates those combinations of  and  for which the transition from
NP to FPP is welfare reducing. The light yellow area indicates combinations for which the
transition to FPP increases welfare.9 As for the white zone, which is exactly the zone where
R chooses 1-Share under NP , the transition to FPP does not change welfare (Proposition
4(i)). Finally, the checked areas (always bordered by red lines on one side) indicate where
the transition to FPP increases e¤orts to create the data. Most notably, Figure 2 suggests
that there is scope for a socially benecial transition to FPP that increases the e¤ort to
create data, as indicated by the overlapping checked and light yellow areas. E¤orts do not
change after transition to FPP in the white zone and decrease everywhere else (Proposition
2). Strategic delay under FPP is unambiguously welfare reducing.
5 Policy Recommendations
The public availability of research data is an important issue from a research policy per-
spective (European Commission, 2012; OECD, 2007; US House of Representatives, 2007).
Several journals and research-funding organizations have recently introduced data availabil-
ity policies (Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer, forthcoming; ESRC, 2010; McCullough,
2009; NIH, 2003; NSF, 2011; Wellcome Trust, 2007). However, compiling and documenting
data and code for subsequent use is costly and the data creators benets of shared data
in the form of recognition or citations to the data are relatively low (Anderson et al., 2008;
Costello, 2009).
On the basis of our ndings and the fact that an institutional response is highly needed to
increase data sharing (Dasgupta and David, 1994) we believe that mandatory data disclosure
policies are necessary. However, they may be implemented along with higher incentives to
share data in order to prevent the creator of the data from choosing to delay her submissions
and decrease the e¤ort in data generation. If such incentives are not implemented younger
researchers who have a higher impatience to publish and possibly have larger cost of data
creation because of inexperience and lack of research assistants might have to carry the
greatest burden from mandatory data disclosure.
5.1 Data Journals and Citations
As the social value of knowledge increases by sharing the data one variable which can be
changed by policy makers is the value of the data for their creator after the last publication if
she discloses the data, D (see Proposition 1). In particular, D could be the increasing value
9See also the proof of Proposition 4 (ii) in Appendix C.
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of data citations10 on academic reputation.11 In this respect, policy-makers and research
funding agencies might incentivize and support the establishment of data journals. The
establishment of data journals in economics may create a market for the exchange of data
and increase the value of a data set for its creator and the availability of data.12 This may
also increase the quality of available data if data publications are subject to a peer-review
process. Lessons could be learned from other disciplines. For instance, Nature (2013) has
announced the launch of the online data journal Scientic Data. Moreover, the online-only
Geoscience Data Journal has recently been launched (Allan, 2012). In addition, incentive
schemes rewarding the production and documentation of data (Fienberg et al., 1985), such
as a new standard of data citation (Altman and King, 2007), should be implemented so
that sharing becomes more valuable to the original creator of data. Examples of recently
established tools for data retention and citation are, among others, Dryad, Figshare and
Zenodo. In general, if the individual academic value of data increases, i.e. due to data
journals and increased and more valuable data citations, some researchers may have an
incentive to specialize in the creation of data if they expect to have a competitive advantage,
i.e. they have the necessary (nancial) resources, knowledge and experience in the creation
of data. This may have a positive e¤ect on the overall quality of available data.
5.2 Journals for Replication Studies
As the publication market for replication studies in economics is limited, investing time
and e¤ort in writing a replication study is not an e¢ cient use of a researchers resources
(Hamermesh, 1997; McCullough et al., 2006; Mirowski and Sklivas, 1991). However, the
establishment of journals for replication studies may induce more researchers to engage in
this eld. The establishment of such journals could strengthen our so-called -e¤ect of data
sharing on the value of published articles. It would increase the ex ante incentives to produce
correct results as authors will anticipate that their papers might be subject to the scrutiny
of replicators. This would be benecial for the academic community as incorrect results
could be removed from the cumulative body of knowledge. The data creating author may
also benet ex post as replication may increase the credibility of her work. In addition, we
hypothesize that replication studies could be particularly benecial for junior researchers,
i.e. PhD candidates or Master students on a research track, due to learning e¤ects. For
10For example, information about the newly implemented data citation standard is available at
http://thedata.org/citation.
11An example of where to share and nd data is Dataverse Network, which o¤ers a solution
for publishing research data or accessing data from other researchers for replication studies. See
http://thedata.org/book/use-and-share-data.
12See Gans and Stern (2010) for a similar discussion on the missing market for ideas in research.
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instance, supervising professors may require their Master students or PhD candidates to
actively contribute to such journals under their guidance. Replication studies would teach
junior researchers the responsible treatment of data and put additional pressure on senior re-
searchers to generate correct data in the rst place (Feigenbaum and Levy, 1993; McCullough
et al., 2006).
5.3 Possible Actions for Universities
First, universities could reward data sharing behavior through additional research grants or
by positively considering sharing in a researcherscareer. For instance, status- and priority-
based rewards such as tenure and prizes for outstanding achievements may incentivize re-
searchers to disclose their data (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Fienberg et al., 1985; Gans and
Stern, 2010; Mukherjee and Stern, 2009). Second, universities could promote data sharing
through institutional assistance. According to Kim and Stanton (2012), the compilation,
preparation and sharing of research data are perceived as costly, thereby preventing re-
searchers from sharing their data. Reducing these obstacles could result in a higher net
benet of sharing data and help to generate a pro-data-sharing attitude. For instance,
some universities have recently taken the lead in this respect by developing data repositories
and structured guidance for the creation of data management plans (Andreoli-Versbach and
Mueller-Langer, forthcoming).
6 Conclusion
We set up a simple model describing the incentives of a researcher to generate novel data,
publish articles and share her data with the research community so that other researchers
can use the data for subsequent empirical research. We compare two di¤erent policies.
First, under "No Policy", the creator of data has complete freedom as when to share her
data voluntarily. Second, under the "First Paper Policy", she is required to share the data
immediately after her rst publication.
The implementation of First Paper Policy may distort her incentives in two fundamental
ways. First, she might strategically delay her submissions in order to continue publishing
with the same data without making it available to others. Second, she might reduce her
e¤ort to create data as she would not be the full residual claimant of her data after the rst
publication. Strategic delaying would prevent other researchers from working on related
subsequent research with the same data. The decision to delay the time of submission
depends on three factors. The rst of these is the impatience to publish of the data-creating
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researcher (as given by the discount factor); the second is the value of the data, i.e. the more
valuable the data the higher is the probability that the researcher will choose to delay her
submissions. The nal factor is how fast the value of the data depreciates as the number of
publications increases.
Our welfare analysis suggests that a mandatory data disclosure policy has negative welfare
properties if it induces the researcher to strategically delay the submission of subsequent
papers. Under this scenario the research community would not be in a position to make
use of the data when it is still valuable for further research. Mandatory data disclosure
may only be welfare enhancing if researchers have no incentives to postpone the time of
their publication and if the positive e¤ect of data availability outweighs the negative e¤ect
associated with reduced e¤orts to create data. We conclude that the implementation of
mandatory data sharing rules should be complemented by other policies that deter strategic
delay, such as career incentives, and increase the stand-alone value of academic data, such as
new standards for data citation and the establishment of data journals. We also recommend
the establishment of journals for replication studies in economics.
As a rst idea for further research, we suggest relaxing the implicit assumption that the
two researchers never work on independent papers (with the same topic) at the same time.
This is particularly likely under the First Paper Policy and may result in a socially wasteful
duplication of research e¤orts.
Finally, as a publication in a top-tier economics journal is highly desired by most re-
searchers and might lead to promotion within a university, the benets of a publication are
likely to outweigh the cost of data sharing. It is questionable whether this result holds for
medium-ranked journals with a data availability policy, where authors may choose compet-
ing journals with similar ranking but without a data availability policy.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Optimal e¤orts, utility and welfare under NP
7.1.1 Researcher publishes one paper and shares at t = 1 (1-Share)
Optimal E¤orts and Utility of Researcher R Under 1-Share, R maximizes
UR;NP share1 = 
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The rst-order conditions (FOCs) are given by
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Cs Optimal E¤orts and Utility Under 1-Share, C maximizes
UC;NP share1 = 
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Welfare under NP if R writes one paper and shares at t = 1 is given by:
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7.1.2 Researcher publishes two subsequent papers and shares at t = 2 (2-Share)
Under 2-Share, R maximizes
UR;NP share2 = 

e0e1
1

(1 +   )  1
2
e21

+ 2

e0e2
1
c   (1 + ) 
1
2
e22

+ 3De0  
1
2
e20:
The FOCs lead to:
@UR;NP share2
@e0
= 0) e1 1

(1 + ) + 2e2
1
c   (1 + ) + 
3D = e0 (e1; e2) ;
@UR;NP share2
@e1
= 0) e0 1

(1 + ) = e1 (e0) ;
@UR;NP share2
@e2
= 0) e0 1
c   (1 + ) = e2 (e0) :
22
By plugging e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) in e0 (e1; e2), we obtain
e0 = e0

1

2
(1 + )2 + e0
2

1
c  
2
(1 + )2 + 3D
() e0   e0

1

2
(1 + )2   e02

1
c  
2
(1 + )2 = 3D
() e0;NP share2 =
3D
1     1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
:
By setting e
0;NP share2
in e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) we obtain:
e1;NP share2 =
3D
1

(1 + )
1     1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
;
e2;NP share2 =
3D
1
c (1 + )
1     1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
:
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e0;NP share2  
3D.
7.1.3 Researcher publishes one paper in t = 1 and never shares (1-Never)
Under 1-Never, R maximizes
UR;NPnever1 = 

e0e1
1

  1
2
e21

+ 2NDe0  
1
2
e20:
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We obtain:
@UR;NPnever1
@e0
= 0) e1 1

+ 2ND = e0 (e1) ;
@UR;NPnever1
@e1
= 0) e0 1

= e1 (e0) :
Plug e1 (e0) in e0 (e1):
e0 = 

e0
1


1

+ 2ND () e0;NPnever1 =
2ND
1     1

2 :
Plug e0;NPnever1 in e1 (e0) to obtain e

1;NPnever1
:
e1;NPnever1 = e

0;NPnever1
1

:
By plugging e0;NPnever1 and e

1;NPnever1
in UR;NPnever1 , we obtain the following utility and
welfare:

0@ 2ND
1     1

2 2ND
1     1

2  1
2
  1
2
 
2ND
1     1

2 1
!21A
+2ND
 
2ND
1     1

2
!
  1
2
 
2ND
1     1

2
!2
= 
0B@ 42ND
1     1

22

1

2
  1
2
42ND
1     1

22

1

21CA+ 42ND
1     1

2   12 42ND
1     1

22
=
1
2

42ND
1     1

22

1

2
+
242ND

1     1

2
2

1     1

22   12 42ND
1     1

22
=
1
2
42ND
1     1

22
 


1

2
+ 2
 
1  

1

2!
  1
!
=
1
2
42ND
1     1

22
 
1  

1

2!
=
1
2
42ND
1     1

2
) UR;NPnever1 = W

NPnever1
=
1
2
e0;NPnever1  
2ND.
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7.1.4 Researcher publishes two subsequent papers and never shares (2-Never)
Under 2-Never, R maximizes
UR;NPnever2 = 

e0e1
1

  1
2
e21

+ 2

e0e2
1
c    
1
2
e22

+ 3NDe0  
1
2
e20:
The FOCs are given by:
@UR;NPnever2
@e0
= 0) 

e1
1


+ 2

e2
1
c  

+ 3ND = e0 (e1; e2)
@UR;NPnever2
@e1
= 0) e0 1

= e1 (e0)
@UR;NPnever2
@e2
= 0) e0 1
c   = e2 (e0)
By plugging e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) in e0 (e1; e2), we obtain
e0 = 

e0
1


1


+ 2

e0
1
c  

1
c  

+ 3ND
() e0 = e0

1

2
+ 2e0

1
c  
2
+ 3ND () e0
 
1  

1

2
  2

1
c  
2!
= 3ND
() e0;NPnever2 =
3ND
1     1

2   2   1
c
2 :
By setting e0;NPnever2 in e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) we obtain:
e1;NPnever2 = e

0;NPnever2
 1

; e2;NPnever2 = e

0;NPnever2
 1
c  :
By setting e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) in UR;NPnever2 , we obtain:

 
e0

e0
1


1

  1
2

e0
1

2!
+ 2
 
e0

e0
1
c  

1
c    
1
2

e0
1
c  
2!
+ 3NDe0  
1
2
e20
= 
 
e20

1

2
  1
2
e20

1

2!
+ 2
 
e20

1
c  
2
  1
2
e20

1
c  
2!
+ 3NDe0  
1
2
e20
= 
1
2
e20

1

2
+ 2
1
2
e20

1
c  
2
  1
2
e20 +
23NDe0
2
=
1
2
 
e20
 


1

2
+ 2

1
c  
2
  1
!
+ 23NDe0
!
:
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Now plug in e0;NPnever2 :
1
2
0B@  62ND
1     1

2   2   1
c
22
 
1  

1

2
  2

1
c  
2!
+ 23ND
 
3ND
1     1

2   2   1
c
2
!1CA
=
1
2
 
  
62ND
1     1

2   2   1
c
2 + 262ND
1     1

2   2   1
c
2
!
= UR;NPnever2 =
1
2
62ND
1     1

2   2   1
c
2 = 12e0;NPnever2  3ND:
7.2 Appendix B: Optimal e¤orts, utility and welfare under FPP
7.2.1 FPP without strategic delay
FPP without strategic delay is equivalent to NP with data sharing at t = 1.
7.2.2 FPP with strategic delay
Under FPP with strategic delay, R maximizes
UR;FPPSD = 

e0e1
1

(1 + )  1
2
e21

+ 2

e0e2
1
c   (1 + ) 
1
2
e22

+ 3De0  
1
2
e20:
From the FOCs we obtain
@UR;FPPSD
@e0
= 0) 2

e1
1

(1 + ) + e2
1
c   (1 + )

+ 3D = e0 (e1; e2) ;
@UR;FPPSD
@e1
= 0) e0 1

(1 + ) = e1 (e0) ;
@UR;FPPSD
@e2
= 0) e0 1
c   (1 + ) = e2 (e0) :
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By plugging e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) in e0 (e1; e2), we obtain
e0 = 
2

e0
1

(1 + )

1

(1 + ) +

e0
1
c   (1 + )

1
c   (1 + )

+ 3D
() e0 = 2
 
e0

1

2
(1 + )2 + e0

1
c  
2
(1 + )2
!
+ 3D
() e0   2e0
  


1

2
+

1
c  
2!
(1 + )2
!
= 3D
() e0;FPPSD =
3D
1  3   1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
:
By setting e0;FPPSD in e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) we obtain:
e1;FPPSD =   e0;FPPSD 
1

(1 + ) ; e2;FPPSD = e

0;FPPSD
 1
c   (1 + ) :
By setting e1 (e0) and e2 (e0) in UR;FPPSD , we obtain:

 
e0

e0
1

(1 + )

1

(1 + )  1
2

e0
1

(1 + )
2!
+2
 
e0

e0
1
c   (1 + )

1
c   (1 + ) 
1
2

e0
1
c   (1 + )
2!
+ 3De0  
1
2
e20
= 
 
2e20

1

2
(1 + )2   1
2
2e20

1

2
(1 + )2
!
+2
 
e20

1
c  
2
(1 + )2   1
2
e20

1
c  
2
(1 + )2
!
+ 3De0  
1
2
e20
=
1
2
3e20

1

2
(1 + )2 +
1
2
2e20

1
c  
2
(1 + )2 + 3De0  
1
2
e20
=  1
2
e20
 
1  3

1

2
(1 + )2   2

1
c  
2
(1 + )2
!
+ 3De0:
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Now plug in e0;FPPSD :
 1
2
62D

1  3   1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2


1  3   1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
2 + 62D
1  3   1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
=
1
2
62D
1  3   1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
() UR;FPPSD =
1
2
e0;FPPSD
3D:
7.3 Appendix C: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 0: Since the denominators of optimal e¤orts depend negatively on
, the e¤orts are positive for all  2 (0; 1] if all of the following conditions hold:
e0;NPnever2 ( = 1) > 0 if 1 
1
2
  1
c22
> 0 (1)
e0;NPnever1 ( = 1) > 0 if 1 
1
2
> 0 (2)
e0;NP share2 ( = 1) > 0 if 1 
(1 + )2
2
  (1 + )
2
c22
> 0 (3)
e0;NP share1 ( = 1) > 0 if 1 
(1 + )2
2
> 0 (4)
e0;FPPSD ( = 1) > 0 if 1 
(1 + )2
2
  (1 + )
2
c22
> 0 (5)
It is clear that conditions (1), (2) and (4) hold whenever condition (3) or, equivalently, (5)
holds. We can rewrite (3) as
c22   (1 + c2)(1 + )2 > 0) (1 + )2 < c
2
1 + c2
2:
Proof of Proposition 1: We rst show that for   1 it always holds that UR;NP share1 
UR;NPnever1 and UR;NP share2  UR;NPnever2 .
The rst inequality is
1
2
42D
1     1

2
(1 + )2
 1
2
42ND
1     1

2 ,  DND
2
 1  
 
1

2
(1 + )2
1     1

2 ; (6)
which holds whenever  = D
ND
 1.
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The second inequality is
1
2
62D
1     1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
 1
2
62ND
1     1

2   2   1
c
2 ,
D
ND
2
 1  1  
 
1

2
(1 + )2   2   1
c
2
(1 + )2
1     1

2   2   1
c
2 ; (7)
which holds whenever  = D
ND
 1, since (1 + )2; (1 + )2  1.
(i) We dene
l() := min
2(0;1]
8<:
s
1  
2
(1 + )2
1  
2
;
vuut1  2 (1 + )2   22c2 (1 + )2
1  
2
  2
2c2
9=; : (8)
Obviously, for   l() the Researcher will choose to never share and l() negatively
depends on . l() is positive for positive e¤orts. We now simplify (8).
Since (1+)
2
2
> 1
2
,
r
1  
2
(1+)2
1  
2
is monotonically decreasing in  and
min
2(0;1]
s
1  
2
(1 + )2
1  
2
=
s
1  (1+)2
2
1  1
2
: (9)
Since (1+)
2
2
> 1
2
and (1+)
2
c22
> 1
c22
,
r
1  
2
(1+)2  2
2c2
(1+)2
1  
2
  2
2c2
is monotonically decreasing
in  and
min
2(0;1]
vuut1  2 (1 + )2   22c2 (1 + )2
1  
2
  2
2c2
=
s
1  (1+)2
2
  (1+)2
2c2
1  1
2
  1
2c2
: (10)
Finally, s
1  (1+)2
2
  (1+)2
2c2
1  1
2
  1
2c2
<
s
1  (1+)2
2
1  1
2
,

1  (1 + )
2
2

1  1
2

  (1 + )
2
2c2

1  1
2

<

1  (1 + )
2
2

1  1
2

  1
2c2

1  (1 + )
2
2

, 1
2c2

1  (1 + )
2
2

<
(1 + )2
2c2

1  1
2

, 2   (1 + )2 < 2(1 + )2   (1 + )2 , 1 < (1 + )2 , 0 < ; (11)
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so we can state
l =
s
1  (1+)2
2
  (1+)2
2c2
1  1
2
  1
2c2
: (12)
(ii) Now we aim to show that for l <  < 1 there always exists some h(; ) > 0, such
that for every   h(; ) it holds UR;NPnever1  UR;NP share1 , UR;NPnever1  UR;NPnever2 and
UR;NPnever1  UR;NP share2 .
So, the rst inequality is equivalent to
1
2
42D
1     1

2
(1 + )2
 1
2
42ND
1     1

2 , 2   2 2  1  2 (1 + )2 ,
  
2(1  2)
(1 + )2   2 ; (13)
where the expression on the right-hand side (r.h.s.) is always positive for  < 1 and  > 0.
Thus, there exists some 00 (; ) :=
2(1 2)
(1+)2 2 2 [0; 1] such that UR;NPnever1  UR;NP share1 for
all   00.
The second inequality is equivalent to
1
2
42ND
1  
2
 1
2
62ND
1  
2
  2
2c2
, 1  
2
  
2
2c2
 2   
3
2
,
c23   (1 + 2c2)2   c2 + 2c2  0: (14)
Denoting the function on the left-hand side (l.h.s.) lhs(), we compute lhs(0) = 2c2 > 0,
lhs(1) =  1 < 0 and
@lhs ()
@
= 3c22   2(1 + 2c2)   c2 < 0 (15)
for all  2 [0; 1]. So there exists some 01 = 01(; ) 2 [0; 1] such that lhs(01) = 0 and
lhs() > 0 for all  < 01.
The third inequality is equivalent to
1
2
42ND
1  
2
 1
2
62D
1  
2
(1 + )2   2
2c2
(1 + )2
,
1  
2
  2
2
2
  
3
2
2   
2
2c2
(1 + )2  22   
3
2
2 ,
3
2
(2   2)  2

2
2
+ 2 +
(1 + )2
2c2

  
2
+ 1  0: (16)
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Denoting the function on the l.h.s. LHS(), we nd that LHS(0) = 1 > 0 and
LHS(1) = (1  2)

1  1
2

  2
2
  
2
2
  (1 + )
2
2c2
: (17)
Further,
@LHS ()
@
= 3
2
2
(2   2)  2

2
2
+ 2 +
(1 + )2
2c2

  1
2
< 0 (18)
for all  2 [0; 1].
If LHS(1) < 0, then there exists some 02 = 02(; ) such that LHS(02) = 0 and
LHS() > 0 for all  < 02. For completeness, dene 02  1 in case LHS(1) > 0.
Combining our considerations, we dene
h(; ) := min f00 ; 01 ; 02g ; (19)
which is always positive for 0    0:5 and l <  < 1. Clearly, for  < h the Researcher
will choose not to share. It remains to show that h(; ) depends nonpositively on both 
and .
Computing the  and  derivatives of the rst term on the r.h.s. of (19), one can see
that both of them are negative everywhere. If 02 = 1, then the statement is proved, since
the rst term is the only one that depends on  and .
We now consider LHS() for a xed  as the function of  and , denoting it LHS(; ).
Notice that
@LHS(; )
@
=  2
3
2
  2

2
2
+
2(1 + )
2c2

< 0 (20)
and
@LHS(; )
@
=
23
2
   22 = 22


2
  1

< 0 (21)
for  2 [0; 1].
So the function LHS() is pointwise monotone decreasing separately in  and . Since
LHS() is monotonically decreasing in point 02 , it follows that 02(; ) depends nonposi-
tively on both  and .
Proof of Proposition 2: See p. 33 for the proofs of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3: We prove the statement generally for all 0    0:5 and
c;  > 1.
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The Researcher chooses to delay strategically under FPP if and only if UR;FPPNSD 
UR;FPPSD , i.e.
42D
2

1  (1+)2
2
  62D
2

1  3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
 , 1  3(1 + )2
2
  
2(1 + )2
c22
 2   
3(1 + )2
2
, 1  2 + 
2(1 + )2
c22
,
s
1
1 + (1+)
2
c22
 ; (22)
where the rst step is correct under the assumption of positive e¤orts. So there is some
hSD = hSD() 2 [0; 1] with UR;FPPNSD  UR;NPSD for every   hSD . Note that hSD()
depends negatively on .
Proof of Proposition 4: (i) We dene h1 so that UNP share1  UNP share2 for   h1. For
this consider
1
2
42D
1  
2
(1 + )2
 1
2
62D
1  
2
(1 + )2   2
c22
(1 + )2
,
1  
2
  22
2
  3 
2
2
  2 (1 + )
2
c22
 2   
3
2
(1 + )2 ,
3
1 + 2
2
  2
"
1 +
2
2
+
(1 + )2
c22
#
  
2
+ 1  0: (23)
Denoting l.h.s. of the last expression LHS() we compute LHS(0) = 1 > 0 and
LHS(1) =
1 + 2
2
  1  2
2
  (1 + )
2
c22
  1
2
+ 1 =  (1 + )
2
c22
< 0: (24)
The rst derivative of LHS with respect to  is
LHS 0 = 3
21 + 2
2
  2

1 +
2
2
+
(1 + )2
c22

  1
2
: (25)
We compute LHS 0(0) =   12 < 0 and
LHS 0(1) =
2(1 + )
2
  2  2(1 + )
2
c22
< 0; (26)
because positive e¤orts imply 1+
2
< 1 (see (4)). The derivative of LHS 0 with respect to
 is monotone as the derivative of any quadratic function and we conclude that LHS() is
monotonically decreasing for all  2 [0; 1]. Accordingly, h1 2 (0; 1) is well-dened as the
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rst positive root of LHS() = 0, i.e. for   h1 it indeed holds UNP share1  UNP share2 .
Now by the proof of Proposition 1, for   1 and   h1 the Researcher will choose to
share after one publication under NP . Whenever the Researcher chooses to share after one
publication under NP , she also chooses not to delay strategically under FPP . We show
this indirectly, proving that sharing after 2 publications strictly dominates strategic delay.
This would imply that the Researcher will not choose strategic delay, because she does not
choose sharing even after 2 publications. UNP share2  UFPPSD is equivalent to
1
2
62D
1  
2
(1 + )2   2
c22
(1 + )2
 1
2
62D
1  3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
 ,
1  
3(1 + )2
2
  
2(1 + )2
c22
 1  
2
(1 + )2   
2
c22
(1 + )2 ,
 
3(1 + )2
2
   
2
(1 + )2 , (1 + )2  2(1 + )2 ,
1 + 2+ 22  2 + 22+ 22 , 1 + 2  2 + 22,
1  2 (1 + 2) + 2  0; (27)
which is true for all  2 (0; 1].
Since sharing after one publication is the same as not delaying strategically, it is clear
that for   1 and   h1 and, analogously, for those cases where  < 1 and the Researcher
chooses to share after one publication under NP , transition to FPP does not inuence
welfare. We rst show the dependence of h1() on  and then discuss the case  < 1.
Consider LHS() for a xed  as the function of  and , denoting it LHS(; ). Notice
that
@LHS(; )
@
= 3
2
2
  2

2
2
+
2
c22
+
2
c22

< 0: (28)
for  2 [0; 1].
So the function LHS() is pointwise monotone decreasing in . Since LHS() is monoton-
ically decreasing in point h1, it follows that h1() depends negatively on .
For the case  < 1 we aim to nd conditions on  and  under which the utility of
sharing after one publication is higher than other utilities. First, we already know from the
beginning of this proof that UR;NP share1  UR;NP share2 for   h1. Second, we know from the
proof of Proposition 1 that for
  h1 :=
vuut1  2 (1 + )2   2c22 (1 + )2
1  
2
  2
c22
(29)
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it holds that UR;NP share2  UR;NPnever2 . So for h1   < 1 and   h1 the Researcher chooses
to make one publication and then either to share or not to share. As we know from the proof
of Proposition 1(ii) (see (13)), this last choice is met in favour of sharing in case
  00() :=
2(1  2)
(1 + )2   2 : (30)
Now 00(1) = 0 and
000() =
 22((1 + )2   2) + 22(1  2)
((1 + )2   2)2
=
22(1  (1 + )2)
((1 + )2   2)2 < 0 (31)
for  > 0. Since h1 does not depend on , there exists some h2 such that 00  h1 for every
  h2.
Dening h := maxfh1 ; h2g we get that the Researcher chooses to share after one
publication if h    1 and 00    h1. Under these conditions 00 = h, since the
relevant term in the denition of h is exactly 00. We get the statement.
(ii) (1) By Proposition 3 and the proof of Proposition 1 (ii), we know, that if l <
  1 and  < h0 := minfh; hSDg, the Researcher will choose to publish one paper and
never share under NP or not to delay strategically under FPP . We also already know the
dependence of l() and h0(; ) on  and . We now show the existence of l and lw such
that for lw <   1 and l <  < h0 it holds that WFPPNSD > WNPnever1 .
The last expression is equivalent to
42D
2

1  (1+)2
2
 + 62D
2c2

1  (1+)2
2
2 > 42ND2  1  
2
 ,
2
264 1
1  (1+)2
2
 + 2
c2

1  (1+)2
2
2
375 > 1 
1  
2
 ,
2 >
264 1  2
1  (1+)2
2
 + 2
c2
1  
2
1  (1+)2
2
2
375
 1
(32)
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Denoting the r.h.s. of the last expression RHS(), we compute RHS(0) = 1 and
RHS(1) =
264 1  12
1  (1+)2
2
 + 1
c2
1  1
2
1  (1+)2
2
2
375
 1
> 0: (33)
Moreover, since (1+)
2
2
> 1
2
, both
1  
2
1  (1+)2
2
 and 1  2
1  (1+)2
2
2 (34)
are monotone increasing and since 2 is also monotone increasing, RHS() is monotonically
decreasing in .
We conclude that for all f with RHS(1) < 
2
f  1 there exists l such that WFPPNSD >
WNPnever1 holds for every f <  < 1 and l <   1.
Dene lw := maxf
p
RHS(1); lg. For  = 1 it holds 2  RHS() for all 0 <   1, so
the set of points (; ) with lw <   1 and l <  < h0 is always nonempty.
Finally, from Proposition 1 l() depends negatively on  and it is easy to see that the
same holds for RHS(1).
(2) There might be a case where 01 <  < minfhSD ; 00g and  < h1, i.e. the Researcher
chooses to never share after two publications under NP or not to delay strategically under
FPP . Therefore, we consider WFPPNSD > WNPnever2 . From this, we obtain
 >
vuuuuut
2
1  
2
  2
c22 
1
1  (1+)2
2
+ 
2
c2

1  (1+)2
2
2
! . (35)
Denoting the term on the r.h.s. l3 (; ), we obtain that FPP increases welfare if 01 <
 < minfhSD ; 00g and l3 <  < h1. It is easy to see that l3() depends negatively on .
Finally, we provide a numerical example which suggests that WFPPNSD > WNP share2 if
h1 <  < hSD . For c =  = 1:5 and  = 0:2 (see Figure 2), it is straightforward to see that
WFPPNSD > WNP share2 if h1 = 0:8171 <  < hSD = 0:8824.
(iii) As we have seen in part (i) of this proof, sharing after two publications strictly domi-
nates strategic delay. This means that whenever the Researcher chooses to delay strategically
under FPP , she could have been better o¤ under NP (even if she would not choose sharing
after two publications in this case, as some other NP option could in its turn dominate
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sharing after two publications). Since WNP share2 = UNP share2 and WFPPSD = UFPPSD , this
means that FPP reduces welfare if the Researcher chooses to delay strategically under it,
i.e. if  > hSD .
Now recall from the proof of Proposition 1, (ii), that there exists some h such that for
 < h 1-Never is the dominant strategy under NP . It follows that for  < minfh; hSDg the
Researcher chooses to never share after one publication underNP or not to delay strategically
under FPP . From (32) we nd out that if
 < l0 :=
vuuuut
264 1  2
1  (1+)2
2
 + 2
c2
1  
2
1  (1+)2
2
2
375
 1
; (36)
then WFPPNSD < WNPnever1 . That is, for  < l0 and  < minfh; hSDg transition to FPP
reduces welfare. l0() depends nonpositively on .
There may remain a case where 01 <  < minfhSD ; 00g and  < h1, i.e. the Researcher
chooses to never share after two publications under NP or not to delay strategically under
FPP . We consider the inequality WFPPNSD < WNPnever2 by taking l3() from (35) into
account.
Together we get that FPP is welfare reducing when
 < l1() :=
8<:l0();  < minfh; hSDgl3(); 01 <  < minfhSD ; 00g and  < h1 (37)
.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) (1) We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that for  < l
the Researcher chooses to never share and decides to publish two papers if and only if  > 01.
From Proposition 3, transition to FPP urges the Researcher to delay strategically if and
only if  > hSD . We now compare the e¤orts to create a data set for di¤erent combinations
of Researchers decisions.
e0;NPnever1 > e

0;FPPNSD
is equivalent to
2
1  
2
>
2
1  (1+)2
2
, 1 
(1+)2
2
1  
2
> : (38)
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e0;NPnever2 > e

0;FPPSD
is equivalent to
3
1  
2
  2
c22
>
3
1  3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
, 1 
3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
1  
2
  2
c22
> : (39)
We dene
le0 () := min
(
min
<minf01 ;hSDg
1  
2
(1 + )2
1  
2
; min
>maxf01 ;hSDg
1  3
2
(1 + )2   2
2c2
(1 + )2
1  
2
  2
2c2
)
(40)
and notice that in general le0 < l, since a square root of a number that is smaller than one
is bigger than the number itself (there is still a little di¤erence between the second term in
the denition of le0 and the term under the second root in the denition of l, so we will
not use this fact in the proof).
It remains to consider the small interval of , with 01 >  > hSD or 01 <  < hSD .
e0;NPnever1 > e

0;FPPSD
is equivalent to
2
1  
2
>
3
1  3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
, 1 
3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
   2
2
> : (41)
e0;NPnever2 > e

0;FPPNSD
is equivalent to
3
1  
2
  2
c22
>
2
1  (1+)2
2
,   
2(1+)2
2
1  
2
  2
c22
> : (42)
Combining all these results we get that for
 < le := min
(
l; le0 ; min01>>hSD
1  3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
   2
2
; min
01<<hSD
   2(1+)2
2
1  
2
  2
c22
)
(43)
transition to FPP reduces e¤orts to create data set for all  2 [0; 1]. It is easy to see that
le() depends negatively on .
(2) When le <  < 1, the Researcher chooses to never share after one publication under
NP or not to delay strategically under FPP if and only if  < minfh(); hSDg, as we know
from the proof of Proposition 1 and from Proposition 3. From (38) we can conclude that in
this case FPP reduces e¤orts to create data set if and only if
1  (1 + )
2
2
>    
2
 , 
2(1  )
(1 + )2    > : (44)
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It follows that for le <  < 1 and
 < he(; ) := min

h(; ); hSD();
2(1  )
(1 + )2   

(45)
transition to FPP reduces e¤orts to create data set.
As 01 does not depend on  or , h(; ) depends negatively on both of them and hSD()
depends negatively on  and does not depend on , he(; ) obviously depends nonpositively
on  and on  as well, since
@

2(1 )
(1+)2 

@
=
 2[(1 + )2   ] + 2(1  )
[(1 + )2   ]2 =
 2[(1 + )2   1]
[(1 + )2   ]2  0: (46)
(3) We want to show that transition to FPP reduces e¤orts to create data set if  >
h = maxfh1 ; h2g and  > maxfh1 ; hSDg. In this case, the Researcher chooses to delay
strategically under FPP (since  > hSD) or to share after 2 publications under NP .
To prove the last statement recall the arguments from the proof of Proposition 4(i).
For  > h1 it holds that UR;NP share2 > UR;NPnever2 . For  > h1 it holds that UR;NP share2 >
UR;NP share1 and for  > 00 we have UR;NP share1 > UR;NPnever1 . Further, h1 > 00 whenever
 > h2 (see the arguments after (31)), so for  > h and  > h1 the Researcher chooses to
share after 2 publications.
e
0;NP share2
> e0;FPPSD is equivalent to
3D
1  2(1+)2
c22
  (1+)2
2
>
3D
1  3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
,  
3(1 + )2
2
>  (1 + )
2
2
,
(1 + )2 > 2(1 + )2 , 1 + 2+ 22 > 2 + 22+ 22 ,
1 + 2 >  ( + 2 ) ; (47)
which is true for all  2 (0; 1]. So whenever the Researcher chooses to delay strategically
under FPP and to share after 2 publications under NP , transition to FPP reduces e¤orts
to create data set.
(ii) Transition to FPP does not inuence e¤orts to create data set whenever the Re-
searcher chooses to share after one publication under NP and not to delay strategically
under FPP , i.e. whenever transition to FPP does not inuence welfare (see Proposition
4(i)).
(iii)(1) As we know from the proof of Proposition 1 and from Proposition 3, for  < 1
and  < min fh; hSDg the Researcher chooses to never share after one publication under
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NP or not to delay strategically under FPP . From the denition of he (see (45)) it follows
that if he <  < min fh; hSDg, then transition to FPP increases e¤orts to create data set.
We show that for  > 0 there always exist such s.
Consider  < 1 near to 1 and small . As was shown in the proof of Proposition 4(i) (see
text after equation (29)), with these parameters the Researcher chooses to make one publica-
tion and then either to share or not to share, so that the relevant condition in min fh; hSDg
is UR;NPnever1  UR;NP share1 , i.e.
00() =
2(1  2)
(1 + )2   2 ; (48)
since 01 and hSD are positive and do not depend on , whereas 00(1) = 0.
Notice that for  = 1 it holds that he = 0. So both 00() and he() continuously
approach 0 as  ! 1. In the neighborhood of  = 1 it holds that 00() > he(), since
2(1  2)
(1 + )2   2 >
2(1  )
(1 + )2    ,
(1 + )2      (1 + )22 + 3 > (1 + )2   2   (1 + )2 + 3 ,
 + (1 + )2 > 1 + (1 + )2 , (1 + )2(1  ) > 1   ,
(1 + )2 > 1; (49)
which is true for  > 0.
For  < le transition to FPP reduces e¤orts to create data set (see this Proposition,
(i)(1)) and it follows that for le <  < 1 and he <  < min fh; hSDg transition to FPP
increases e¤orts to create data set.
(2) For  < h1 (see (29)) and  > max f01 ; hSD ; h1g the Researcher chooses to never
share after two publications under NP or to delay strategically under FPP . Further we
know from this proof, (i)(1), that in this case FPP increases e¤orts to create data set if and
only if
ule() :=
1  3(1+)2
2
  2(1+)2
c22
1  
2
  2
c22
< : (50)
Since a square root of a number between 0 and 1 is bigger than the number itself, for
 = 1 and  > 0 it holds ule < h1. It follows that FPP increases e¤orts to create a data
set when ule() <  < h1 and  > max f01 ; hSD ; h1g, whereby the set of such (; ) is
always nonempty.
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